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Abstract 
The European Commission (EC) and the European Courts have being reaffirming in the 
Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica cases that guide-prices established by sector regulators upon 
electronic communications incumbents cannot per se exclude that conducts with 
anticompetitive foreclosure effects, such as margin squeeze, undertaken within the boundaries 
of those pre-established prices, can be considered abusive under Article 102 TFEU. 
The paper aims at showing that the reasoning put forward by the EC and the Courts not only 
dismantles the defensive reasoning put forward by the incumbents before the EC and on appeal 
before the Courts but actually reaffirms the centrality of the enforcement activity of the EC. 
The paper examines the reasoning behind the “regulatory authority’s instructions defence” – 
the argument of the incumbents stating that their actions were justified because they had set 
their wholesale access prices and retail prices in line with the guidelines imposed by the 
sectorial regulators. Recalled in this context were also the principles of proportionality, 
subsidiarity and fair cooperation between the EC and individual Member States. 
The affirmation of the “heliocentric” doctrine that puts the EC at the hearth of competition law 
enforcement vis á vis national regulators and domestic legislation (provided decisions of the 
regulatory authorities can be considered secondary law sources) should take into consideration 
the important precedent of Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi. The latter affirms that competition 
authorities can automatically put aside legislation that goes against Article 101 TFEU. 
However, they cannot impose pecuniary fines when certain behaviours are imposed by national 
legislation (while they can impose fines if those behaviours were suggested or facilitated by 
national legislation).  
Keywords: Regulatory authorities, national sector regulators, national competition authorities, 
electronic communications, proportionality, subsidiarity, cooperation, enforcement, price caps, 
margin squeeze, wholesale access, retail price 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In two important cases of the last decade, Deutsche Telekom1 and Telefónica2, the 
European Commission (hereafter: EC or Commission) and European Courts reaffirmed that 
guide-prices imposed by National Regulatory Authorities (hereafter: NRAs or regulators) upon 
electronic communications incumbents cannot, per se, exclude the realisation that the 
foreclosing conducts of incumbents (such as those determined by margin squeeze) may be 
considered abusive under Article 102 TFEU3. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the reasoning put forward by the Commission 
and European Courts not only dismantles the defensive reasoning put forward by the 
incumbents before the EC and, on appeal, before the Courts but actually reaffirms the centrality 
of the enforcement activity of the Commission. 
The position of the EC and European Courts underlines the supremacy of competition 
law over regulatory measures and sets out some important consequences thereof. On the one 
hand, the authoritative power of NRAs is restricted, at least at the European level (or where 
                                                          
 
* Ph.D. in Law (King’s College London), module teacher of EU Competition Law, La Sapienza, Rome - 
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1 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), [2003] OJ L263/9 (14 
October 2003). On appeal, judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. 
Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 CMLR 631; on appeal to the Court of Justice (CJ) Deutsche Telekom 
AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, [2010] 5 CMLR 1495.  
2 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’). On appeal, judgment of 
the General Court (GC), Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, 
ECR I-0000, judgment of 29 March 2012; on appeal before the Court of Justice (CJ), Case C-295/12 (see opinion 
of Advocate General (AG) Wathelet delivered 26 September 2013 accessible at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-09/cp130117en.pdf], judgment of 10 July 2014, 
ECR I-0000 [not yet published]. 
3 W. Wils, “Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 – A retrospective”, presentation at the conference ‘10 Years of 
Regulation 1/2003’, Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation, 7 June 2013, accessible at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2274013. 
they have enforcement powers4), by the reaffirmation of the centrality of the enforcement 
action of the Commission. On the other hand, the benefits deriving from specialised 
intervention by sectorial regulators seem nullified when the EC’s approach diverges from the 
guidelines provided by NRAs. 
A similar trend, reaffirming the leading role of the Commission in enforcing EU 
competition law, expands beyond the area of the electronic communications sector. In the 
energy sector, in particular, the EC has already encouraged electricity and gas incumbents to 
adopt structural remedies to address competition concerns on several occasions. By doing so, 
it went beyond the scope of sector-specific legislation that foresees less invasive, behavioural 
remedies. Three recent cases of commitments – E.ON5, RWE6 and ENI7 - go in this direction.  
The paper examines the reasoning behind “NRAs’ recommended practices defence”. It 
also assesses the incumbents’ arguments that they had established their wholesale access prices 
in line with the guidelines recommended (and, in certain cases, imposed) by their NRAs. Their 
second line of defence was usually that of recalling the principles of proportionality, 
subsidiarity and fair cooperation between the Commission and individual Member States, 
arguing that EC decisions had somehow been undermining the unity of the legal system.  
It is useful to look at the relevant cases to see the line of reasoning followed by the 
Commission and the European Courts.  
 
II. The Deutsche Telekom case and the influence of the Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi 
case 
 
The Deutsche Telekom8 case of 2003 can be considered the leading case of margin 
squeeze at European level in the electronic communications sector. The German telecoms 
incumbent, Deutsche Telekom (hereafter: DT), was fined by the EC for exclusionary abuse. 
                                                          
4 For instance, OFCOM has sector specific enforcement powers under the Communications Act 2003 (2003 
Chapter 21), accessible at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/introduction. 
5 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ C36/8 of 13 
February 2009, accessible at http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
6 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, summary decision in 
[2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf. 
7 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010, [2010] OJ C352/8 of 23 December 
2010, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39315/39315_3019_9.pdf. 
8 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), [2003] OJ L263/9   (14 
October 2003); CFI judgment Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR-II-477, [2008] 5 
CMLR 631; CJ judgment, Case C-280/08  Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission [2010] ECR I-09555, 
[2010] 5 CMLR 1495. 
The incumbent was found to be dominant in the provision of both wholesale fix telephony 
network (so called ‘local loop’) access, and in the downstream market for the provision of retail 
services to end customers. The retail services included fixed telephony, ISDN and ADSL 
services. In other words, DT, the provider of wholesale (upstream) services for access to the 
local loop, was also a direct competitor on the retail market of the purchasers of its services.  
The European Commission found that DT had abused in two different ways in two 
different timeframes.  
The first abuse consisted in DT charging competitors, from 1998 until 2001, for access 
to its local network ‘more for unbundled access at wholesale level than it charged its own 
subscribers for access at the retail level’9. This margin squeeze practice, consisting in a negative 
spread between the two sets of charges, was evident and did not required any further costs 
analysis. 
The second form of margin squeeze, put in place from 2002 until the decision was made 
(May 2003), was more subtle. After 2002, the prices charged to its competitors for wholesale 
access became lower than the retail subscription prices charged to its own customers, 
determining a positive spread. However, the Commission found that the positive spread ‘was 
still not sufficient for DT to cover its own product-specific cost for the supply of comparable 
end-user services’10, and still consisted in a margin squeeze practice prohibited by Article 102 
TFEU.  
The EC decision imposed a fine of EUR 12.6 million for DT abusing its dominant 
position by way of margin squeeze. DT appealed arguing that its wholesale access prices had 
been set by the German telecommunications regulatory authority – Regulierungsbehörde für 
Telekommunikation und Post (hereafter: RegTP)11. On appeal, the European judiciary 
confirmed that competition law provisions (in particular, the prohibition to put in place 
exclusionary conduct under Article 102 TFEU) prevail over regulatory obligations (prices-
caps)12.  
                                                          
9 See paras 152 and 153 of the Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 
37.579), [2003] OJ L263/9 (14 October 2003). See also Klotz, R., Fehrenbach, J., ‘Two Commission decisions 
on price abuse in the telecommunications sector’, (2003) no. 3, Competition Policy Newsletter, European 
Commission, 8 and Whish, R., Bailey, D., Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012), p 756. 
10 See paras 154-162 of the Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 
37.579), [2003] OJ L263/9 (14 October 2003). See also Klotz, R., Fehrenbach, J., ‘Two Commission decisions 
on price abuse in the telecommunications sector’, (2003) no. 3, Competition Policy Newsletter, European 
Commission, 9 and Whish, R., Bailey, D., Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2012), 756-757. 
11 Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP), the German electronic communications 
regulator, active since 1 January 1998. 
12 CFI judgment, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, para 70 ff. See also CJ judgment, Case C-
280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission, paras 77-96. 
DT’s defence partly was based on the argument that the company’s management had 
no margins of discretion in setting its prices. Indeed, under the German regulatory regime, the 
NRA established a “price-cap” for local loop interconnection rates, rather than a mere 
regulatory mechanism. Starting from the cost-orientation principle, the incumbent had a margin 
to fix the price within the threshold of that price cap13. DT argued that the Commission should 
not have intervened to assess whether the “margin” established by DT was infringing 
competition law principles (in particular, exclusionary practices, as per Art. 102 TFEU) the 
incumbent stated that since the price-cap had been set by the regulator, DT’s pricing policy 
could not be considered abusive14. However the Commission replied that the European Courts  
“have consistently held that the competition rules may apply where the sector-specific 
legislation does not preclude the undertakings it governs from engaging in autonomous 
conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition. This is particularly so in the case 
of complaints submitted to the Commission regarding possible violation of the EU 
competition rules. In such cases the Commission has a duty to investigate, and if 
necessary to order appropriate remedies”15. 
The Commission argued that the imposition of regulatory tools does not preclude the 
undertaking from applying the principles of competition law16. Therefore, it focused on 
demonstrating that there was an evident disproportion between wholesale charges and retail 
charges for access to the local network. Even though the charges in both cases (wholesale and 
retail) were subject to sector-specific regulation, DT had commercial discretion which allowed 
it to restructure its tariffs further so as to “reduce or indeed to put an end to the margin 
squeeze”17. The Commission found that having failed to do so, DT had carried out a practice 
of margin squeeze constituting the imposition of unfair selling prices within the meaning of 
Article 102 (a) TFEU. 
                                                          
13 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG, para 32. With respect to the second margin squeeze abusive 
practice (period of time: 2002/2003): ‘Under the German telecommunications charges order, the price cap method 
is the preferred tariff regulation tool: strict cost orientation is applied to an individual retail service only if that 
service cannot be allocated to one of the predetermined baskets (39). This means that the firm whose charges are 
regulated has some discretion to fix its prices on a commercial basis. The price cap system is made up of one price 
cap decision, laying down the division of services into baskets, the price adjustment guideline and other general 
terms for a specified period, and other decisions reached on individual applications for adjustments to charges 
during that price cap period’. 
14 Ibid, para 53. 
15 Ibid, para 54. 
16 Ibid, para 55 “[…] Given the detailed nature of the ONP rules and the fact that they may go beyond the 
requirements of Article 86 [now Article 102 TFEU], undertakings operation in the telecommunications sector 
should be aware that compliance with the Community competition rules does not absolve them of their duty to 
abide by obligations imposed in the ONP context, and vice versa”. 
17 Ibid, para 57. 
A definition of margin squeeze is provided in paragraphs 106 and 107 of the EC decision 
where it is said that “there is an abusive margin squeeze if the difference between the retail 
prices charged by a dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors 
for comparable services is negative, or insufficient to cover the product-specific costs to the 
dominant operator of providing its own retail services on the downstream market”18. 
The definition of “anticompetitive pressure” can be found in paragraph 108 of the 
decision. The Commission states therein that it is  
“exerted on competitors’ trading margins, which are non-existent or too narrow to 
enable them to compete with the established operator on retail access markets. An 
insufficient spread between a vertically integrated dominant operator’s wholesale and 
retail charges constitutes anticompetitive conduct especially where other providers are 
excluded from competition on the downstream market even if they are at least as 
efficient as the established operator”19.  
The Commission concluded that DT had abused its dominant position in the relevant 
markets for direct access to its fixed telephone network, as per Article 102 (a) TFEU. Such 
abuse consisted of, in particular, charging unfair prices for (i) wholesale access services to 
competitors and (ii) retail access services in the local network. The Commission found that DT 
was “in a position to end the margin squeeze entirely by adjusting its retail charges. [Later] DT 
could in any event have reduced the margin squeeze, by increasing the ADSL retail access 
charges not subject to the price cap system”20. However, it did not do so.  
The EC decision was appealed before the Court of First Instance (hereafter: CFI) (now 
the General Court), but it was upheld in its entirety. The CFI considered that DT had had the 
opportunity to bring to an end, or to reduce, the margin squeeze deriving from the difference 
between its retail and its wholesale charges, if only the incumbent had applied to the German 
regulator for a review of these charges. The CFI deemed that in failing to do so, the EC was 
right to apply Article 102 TFEU to DT’s abusive conduct, even in the presence of price caps 
established by the NRA. The CFI observed that: “decisions of national authorities in respect of 
Community telecommunications law do not in any way affect the Commission’s power to find 
infringements of competition law”21.  
DT argued before the CFI (para 70 ff) that  
                                                          
18Ibid, para 107. 
19 Ibid, para 108. 
20 Ibid, para 109. 
21 Press release of the GC No. 26/08 on the CFI judgment in Case T-271/03 (CJE/08/26 of 10 April 2008). 
“[it] did not have sufficient scope to avoid the margin squeeze alleged in the contested 
decision. [The] Commission itself found that the applicant did not have scope to fix 
charges for wholesale access. Charges for wholesale access, which are fixed by RegTP, 
ought to correspond to the cost of efficient service provisions. Therefore, they do not 
need to correspond to the applicant’s costs”22. Again, the applicant argued that “did not 
have scope to fix its charges for retail access either. As regards the period from 1998 to 
2001, any abuse by the applicant is precluded by the fact that RegTP alone […] is 
responsible for the applicant’s charges for narrowband connections […]”23 .  
The incumbent admitted that it could have had, after 2002, room to manoeuvre with 
respect to narrowband connections and so it could have been accused of abuse of its dominant 
position only after 2002. However, DT argued also that prices of narrowband access would not 
have caused conducts to be considered margin squeeze captured under what is now Article 102 
TFEU24. DT expressly stressed how, as far as narrowband connections are concerned, “[…] 
under German law, all its retail prices had to be examined and approved in advance by RegTP 
[…]. The applicant […] could not depart from the charges thus authorised without incurring a 
fine – [and] cannot therefore be regarded as having infringed Article [102 TFEU] by applying 
those charges”25.  
DT was very bold in stating that it could not be blamed for the contested behaviour (in 
particular, for fixing retail prices for narrowband connections before 2002) simply because the 
contested prices had been established by RegTP. Furthermore, the incumbent claimed that it 
could not have departed from those prices without being fined by the NRA26. More 
interestingly, DT stressed the related ruling of the German Court of Justice (Bundesgerightshof) 
delivered on 10 February 2004 that had set aside the judgment of the Düsseldorf court (16 
January 2004). DT noted that the Bundesgerightshof had agreed with DT’s claim that the 
RegTP usually has to check whether  
“a charge to which a request for authorisation relates is compatible with Article 82 EC 
and that responsibility for any infringement of article 82 EC can only exceptionally be 
ascribed to the undertaking which applied for the charge to be authorised27. The 
applicant observes that RegPT itself has concluded on several occasions since 1998 that 
                                                          
22 CFI judgment, T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, para 70. 
23 Ibid, para 71. 
24 Ibid, para 72. 
25 Ibid, para 73. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, para 79. 
there is no margin squeeze to the detriment of the applicant’s competitors. Furthermore, 
the Bundesgerichtshof expressly left open the question of the applicant’s responsibility 
under competition law on account of the regulated charges”28. 
By contrast, the CFI was adamant in stating that “[…] Articles 81 and 82 may apply, 
however, if it is found that the national legislation leaves open the possibility of competition 
which may be prevented, restricted or distorted by the autonomous conduct of undertakings 
[…]”29. Moreover, “[…], if a national law merely encourages or makes it easier30 for 
undertakings to engage in autonomous anti-competitive conduct, those undertakings remain 
subject to Article 81 EC and 82 EC”31. The CFI expressly recalled here, among various 
precedents, the Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (hereafter: CIF) 32 case. 
Indeed, a few lines before this statement, the CFI had reaffirmed the concept contained 
in the CIF judgment whereby:  
“[…] Articles 81 EC and 82 EC apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by 
undertakings on their own initiative. If anti-competitive conduct is required of 
undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which 
itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Article 81 EC and 
82 EC do not apply. In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not attributable, 
as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings”33 
and “the possibility of excluding particular anticompetitive conduct from the scope of 
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, on the ground that it has been required of the undertaking in 
question by existing national legislation or that the legislation has eliminated any 
possibility of competitive conduct on their part, has been only partially accepted by the 
Court of Justice”34.  
The CFI acknowledged therefore that it was first necessary to look at the applicable 
national legislation to see whether that legislation gave the incumbent any room for 
manoeuvre35. 
The CFI arrived at the conclusion that  
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, para 88. 
30 Emphasis added. 
31 Ibid, para 89. 
32 ECJ judgment, Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi [2003] ECR I-8055, [2003] 5 CMLR 829, para 
67. 
33 CFI judgment, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, para 85. 
34 Ibid, para 86. 
35 Ibid, para 90. 
“[…]even on the assumption that RegTP is obliged to consider whether retail charges 
proposed by the applicant are compatible with Article 82 EC, the Commission would 
not thereby be precluded from finding that the applicant was responsible for an 
infringement. The Commission cannot be bound by a decision taken by a national body 
pursuant to article 82 EC (see, to that effect, Case C-344/98 MasterfoodsandHB [2000] 
ECR I-11369, para graph 48)”36.  
Furthermore, the CFI found that DT had a margin of discretion at least with respect to 
the setting of retail prices in such a way as to avoid engaging in margin squeeze. At para 131, 
the CFI expressly points out that the incumbent did not use the discretion at its disposal so as 
to secure an increase in its retail prices, which would have helped to reduce the margin squeeze 
in the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001. On the contrary, DT used that 
discretion to even further lower its retail prices in respect of ISDN lines during that period”37. 
The CFI confirmed therefore the findings of the EC, reaffirming that the German incumbent 
had indeed abused its dominant position, within the margin of discretion which it still had, 
within the thresholds (price caps) set by the German regulator.  
The DT judgment stressed also the negative effects of the contested practice on the 
communications market as a whole, saying that margin squeeze  
“will in principle hinder the growth of competition in the downstream markets. If the 
applicant’s retail prices are lower than its wholesale charges, or if the spread between 
the applicant’s wholesale and retail charges is insufficient to enable an equally efficient 
operator to cover its product-specific costs of supplying retail access services, a 
potential competitor who is just as efficient as [DT] would not be able to enter the retail 
access services market without suffering losses”38.  
In response to DT’s claims, the CFI replied that the practice of the European judiciary 
had consistently gone in the direction of considering Article 101 and 102 TFEU of prevailing 
weight over national legislation (including the provisions set out by NRAs) when the latter 
“leaves open the possibility of competition which may be prevented, restricted or distorted by 
the autonomous conduct of undertakings […]”39. If national legislation makes it easier for 
companies to infringe competition law, they are still subject to Article 101 and 102 TFEU40. 
The CFI argued therefore that it had first to ascertain whether the “German legal framework” 
                                                          
36 Ibid, para 120. 
37 Ibid, para 31. 
38 CFI judgment, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, para 237. Emphasis added. 
39 Ibid, para 86 ff. 
40 Ibid, para 89. 
(including also the rules set out by the telecom regulator) would have left some margin of 
discretion to the undertaking or not41.  
DT went further in its defence claiming that the German NRA was obliged, according to 
national law, to verify and examine the conformity of the requested adjustment of charges “with 
[…] other legal provisions (said by the applicant to include Article 82 EC) […]”42. In other 
words, DT tried not only to justify its conduct with the fact that it had set its behaviour within 
the range authorised by the German regulator, but also that the latter “had to act”, by law, in 
line with European provisions. However, the CFI correctly recalled in this context the CIF43 
case and confirmed the obligation of all organs of the State to respect the provisions of the 
Treaty. The CFI added that  
“the national regulatory authorities operate under national law which may, as regards 
telecommunications policy, have objectives which differ from those of community 
competition policy (see the Commission’s Notice of 22 August 1998 on the application 
of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector – 
framework, relevant markets and principles (OJ) 1998 C 265, p. 2), Paragraph 13)”44. 
The CFI stressed also how the same NRA found that “the competitors are not so 
prejudiced with regard to their competitive opportunities45 in the local network by the slight 
difference between retail and wholesale prices at to make it economically impossible for them 
to enter the market successfully or even to remain in the market”. It thus somehow confirmed 
that it was not only DT, but also the German telecoms regulator, that were not fully aware of 
the anticompetitive consequences of DT’s conducts within a theoretically complete legal 
framework of tariffs designed by that very regulator46. 
In its judgment, the CFI had also to look whether the Commission “has established to the 
requisite legal standard in the contested decision that the applicant has sufficient scope in the 
period from 1st January 1998 to 31 December 2001 to [avoid] the margin squeeze […]. In that 
respect, the Commission stated in the contested decision that the applicant ‘was in a position 
[during that period] to end the margin squeeze entirely by adjusting its retail charges’ […]”47.  
The CFI stressed that Treaty provisions (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) had to be 
applied by NRAs. It also confirmed that the Commission was the ultimate guardian of 
                                                          
41 Ibid, para 90. 
42 Ibid, para 112. 
43 ECJ judgment, Case C-198/01 CFI [2003] ECR-I 8055, [2003] 5 CMLR 829, para 67. 
44 CFI judgment, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, para 113. 
45 Emphasis added. 
46 CFI judgment, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, para 117. Emphasis added. 
47 Ibid, para 132. Emphasis added. 
compliance with those provisions by NRAs, indirectly carrying out its own scrutiny over the 
regulators. Hence, paragraph 140 of the judgment concluded that  
“the Commission was entitled to find in the contested decision (recitals 164 and 199) that 
the applicant had sufficient scope during the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 
2001 to end entirely the margin squeeze complained of in that decision”48.  
A similar conclusion was reached with respect to the time from 1 January 2002 to the 
adoption of the decision (May 2003) with respect to the margin squeeze identified in the EC 
decision by way of increasing DT’s charges for its ASL access services49.  
In other words, the DT judgment is fundamental in proving that the position of the 
European Courts is unequivocally in favour of the Commission’s enforcement activity aimed 
at addressing distortions of competition. This is so even in the presence of ex ante measures 
imposed by NRAs which do not stop incumbents from adopting prices that ultimately amount 
to an anticompetitive conduct (margin squeeze in the examined case).  
The judgment concluded that “while it is not inconceivable that the German authorities 
also infringed [EU] law – particularly the provisions of Directive 90/388/EC, as amended by 
Directive 96/19 – by opting for a gradual rebalancing of connection and call charges, such a 
failure to act, if it were to be established, would not remove the scope which the applicant had 
to reduce the margin squeeze”50.  
The judgment of the CFI was upheld in December 2010 by the Court of Justice (hereafter: 
CJ) which confirmed the correctness of the original conclusion concerning the duty of the 
incumbent to operate in line with competition law principles, even in the presence of éspace 
de manoeuvre established by the NRA. The second instance judgment confirmed that even in 
the presence of a specific approval by the NRA of wholesale prices proposed by a given 
incumbent, if the latter has the possibility of bringing to an end an existing margin squeeze, it 
is obliged to comply with Article 102 TFEU:  
“According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is only if anti-competitive conduct 
is required51 of undertakings by national legislation, or if the latter creates a legal 
framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, 
that Articles 81 EC and 82 EC do not apply. In such a situation, the restriction of 
competition is not attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous 
                                                          
48 Ibid, para 140. 
49 Ibid, para 151. 
50 Ibid, para 265. 
51 Emphasis added. 
conduct of the undertakings. Articles 81 and 82 EC may apply, however, if it is found 
that the national legislation leaves open the possibility of competition which may be 
prevented, restricted or distorted by the autonomous conduct of undertakings”52. 
The CJ recalled in its judgments key jurisprudence showing that even though national 
provisions may actually induce companies to infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, companies 
(as well as national legal entities) have a duty to comply with Treaty provisions53. The CJ 
stressed here that the fact that DT “was encouraged by the intervention of the national 
regulatory authority such as REgTP to maintain the pricing practices which led to the margin 
squeeze of competitors who are at least as efficient as the appellant cannot, as such, in any way 
absolve the appellant from responsibility under Article 82 EC”54.  
The CJ went a step further in stating that “[a]dmittedly it is not inconceivable, as the 
appellant observes, that the national regulatory authorities may themselves have infringed 
Article 82 EC in conjunction with article 10 EC, and therefore that the Commission could have 
brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations against the Member State concerned”55. The 
CJ (paragraph 105) stressed how DT, in its appeal, reiterated the same arguments put forward 
before in the first instance, in particular, its “good faith” in complaining with the instructions 
received from the NRA (not challenged by national courts). However, DT did not provide any 
further elements to deduct that the first instance court erred in law in claiming that both the 
NRA and the incumbent are bound by EU competition law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) and 
that the Commission complied with its duties in investigating and finding that the company 
had abused of its dominant position.  
The analysis of the DT case-law shows a coherent line of reasoning. In 2008 the CFI and in 
2010 the CJ confirmed the position already clarified by the CJ in the Consorzio Industrie 
Fiammiferi judgment in 2003. Where a margin of discretion is left by national provisions, and 
the management of the undertaking still have the possibility of modifying the line of conduct 
(in the DT case, to avoid infringement of Art. 102 TFEU, bringing to an end the margin squeeze 
practice), the presence of regulatory provisions adopted in line with European directives (in the 
captioned matter, provisions of the national telecoms regulator setting retail and wholesale 
                                                          
52 CJ judgment, Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, para 80. Emphasis added. 
53 Ibid, para 81, 82, 83. In particular the CJEU also recalls the Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 
3461, para 57, where it stresses that the dominant undertakings have a special responsibility not to allow their 
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.  
54 Ibid, para 84. 
55 Ibid, para 91 (emphasis added).  
access prices) does not per se preclude the possibility that the incumbent will be fined by the 
competition authority (Commission).  
III. The position of European Courts in the Telefónica case  
 
It must be noted that not long before the Court of First Instance (now General Court, 
hereinafter, GC) delivered its judgment on the Deutsche Telekom case on 10 April 2008, the 
Commission has decided in July 2007 another case of margin squeeze – the Telefónica case56. 
This second decision is interesting not only because the fine imposed on the Spanish incumbent 
was higher (EUR 151 million), but also because of the relevance given to the effects on 
competition of the margin squeeze. In this decision, the Commission evidently took into 
consideration the Article 102 TFEU review triggered by the Discussion Paper of 2005. 
The Telefónica decision relates to the abuse of a dominant position carried out by way 
of margin squeeze over a significant period of time (five years) with respect to the wholesale 
broadband access market at the national and regional level (not a local loop unbundling case). 
The incumbent charged high broadband access rates to its competitors, keeping the access rate 
very low for its own retail broadband access services, and thus forcing competitors out of the 
market. This conduct not only damaged competitors in the long term (leading to the severe 
fine) but also hindered many companies from entering the market, consequently excluding final 
consumers from having access to broadband services57. 
The Commission pointed out that unless competitors decided to create an alternative 
network, which was not viable economically, they had no other choice but to deal with the 
incumbent to get access to its ADSL enabled local loops in order to provide DSL access 
services58. The decision noted that from 2002 onwards, the Spanish regulator mandated 
wholesale access to the incumbent’s network at national and regional level in favour of 
competitors (paragraphs 289-290). Access rates were set applying the so-called retail minus 
                                                          
56 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’); on appeal, judgment of 
the GC of 29 March 2012, Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission [2007] OJ C269/55, 
ECR I-0000; on appeal, judgment of the CJ of 10 July 2014, Case C-295/12  not yet published; see also opinion 
of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 2013 accessible at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-09/cp130117en.pdf). 
57 Nellie Kroes, former Commissioner for Competition at the European Commission, pointed out that Spanish 
consumers paid 20% more than the EU-15 average for broadband access, with a rate of penetration 20% below 
EU-15 average, and a growth 30% lower that of the EU-15. See press release IP/07/1011 of 4th July 2007. 
58 See para 74 of the decision: “An undertaking wishing to provide broadband access to the end-users throughout 
the Spanish territory has no other option, save the economically not viable roll-out of an alternative nation-wide 
access network, but to contract one of the wholesale ADSL services available on the market, which are all built 
on TESAU’s access network consisting of ADSL enabled local loops”.  
price regime59, which has a number of positive consequences. The retail minus price regime: 
(i) does not alter recovery of costs of wholesale access; (ii) it should avoid margin squeeze 
between the incumbent’s wholesale and retail prices; (iii) it ensures productive efficiency (a 
potential entrant enters only if entry is viable, which occurs only if that entrant is more efficient 
than the incumbent in the given downstream activity); and (iv) the system preserves the 
incentives of networks operators (including the incumbent) to invest in their own infrastructure. 
Access based on similar price conditions was in line with both the 1998 liberalization 
regulatory framework60, and with the electronic communications regulatory package of 2000 
(in particular with the Framework Directive61 and the Access Directive62).  
The decision at stake is particularly important for the relevance given to the abuse’s 
exclusionary effects on competition, in line with the new perspective that forms the basis of the 
Discussion Paper and Guidance Paper63. The decision showed that the margin squeeze 
“affected Telefónica’s competitors’ ability to enter into the relevant market and exert a 
competitive restraint on Telefónica”64. As a result of the margin squeeze, Telefónica’s 
competitors, even those as efficient as the incumbent, incurred “unsustainable” losses, being 
ultimately forced to leave the competition and discouraged from innovating and investing in 
new infrastructures (impact on growth). 
The GC dismissed an appeal against the Telefónica decision in March 201265. In its 
judgment, the GC rejected the claim submitted by the incumbent that the Commission (i) had 
not taken into consideration that the infringement was committed in part through simple 
negligence by Telefónica, or (ii) had considered its negligence as “extremely serious”. The GC 
                                                          
59 Under the retail-minus system, the wholesale access charge is set at the vertically-integrated operator’s retail 
price minus the incremental cost of providing downstream services and any network elements supplied by the 
access seeker. See W.J. Baumol-J.G. Sidak, The pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, (1994) 11 Yale Journal of 
Regulation, 196. 
60 As confirmed by the judgment given in preliminary ruling by ECJ on 13 December 2001 in Case C-79/00 
Telefónica de España vs. Administración General del Estado [2001] ECR I-10057. 
61 Art. 8 of the Framework Directive. 
62 Art. 8 of the Access Directive. 
63 Commission Decision Wanadoo España vs. Telefónica (Case COMP/38.784) of 4 July 2007, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38784/38784_311_10.pdf. The Telefónica decision 
devotes a large part of the text to the impact assessment of the abusive conduct (para 564 to para 618) showing 
high interest not only for the mere effects of the margin squeeze on competitors and consumers but also, more 
generally, on the entire broadband market, the Spanish economy as a whole, and as part of the European 
construction. 
64 See point 3.3. “Effects of the abuse” of the summary of the Commission Decision Telefónica, in OJ C83/6 of 2 
April 2008. 
65 GC judgment, Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v. Commission. The judgment was 
confirmed upon appeal by CJ judgment, Case C-295/12, decided on 10 July, 2014, ECR I-0000 (not yet 
published), operative part of the judgment accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.315.01.0003.01.ENG. 
confirmed that the company was dominant in the wholesale markets where the margin squeeze 
occurred and rejected Telefónica’s claim that the Commission had failed to carry out a margin 
squeeze test based on an optimal mix of available wholesale products.  
The Court confirmed also the approach kept in the Deutsche Telekom case with respect 
to the balance between application of ex ante provisions and compliance with EU competition 
law, stating that the decisions taken by NRAs on the basis of a national regulatory framework 
do not release dominant firms from their duty to comply with EU competition law66.  
Similarly to the Deutsche Telekom case, it must be stressed that the GC made it clear that 
“Article 82 EC applies only to anti-competitive conducts engaged in by undertakings on their 
own initiative. If anticompetitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or 
if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive 
activity on their part, Article 82 EC does not apply”67. However, “Article 82 EC may apply if 
it is found that the national legislation does not preclude undertakings from engaging in 
autonomous conduct which prevents, restricts or distorts competition”68. The same stance was 
presented by the Adv Gen Wathelet69 in the appeal proceedings before the CJ, position 
substantially upheld in the CJ judgment delivered on 10 July 201470.  
The GC also rejected the argument put forward by Telefónica that “the Commission had 
at its disposal an ad hoc formal instrument of intervention resulting from Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive, which enabled it to intervene in a situation such as that at issue in the 
present case”71. In other words, Telefonica argued that the Commission should have followed 
a regulatory approach rather than adopting a decision imposing a pecuniary fine. The GC stated 
clearly, however, that ex-ante remedies do not exclude the intervention of the Commission 
when Article 102 TFEU is infringed: 
“The existence of that measure [as per Article 7 of the Framework Directive72] has no 
effect whatsoever on the powers which the Commission derives directly from Article 
3(1) of Regulation no 17 and, since 1 May 2004, from Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003 
                                                          
66 GC judgment, Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v. Commission, paras 327 ff. 
67 Ibid, para 328. 
68 Ibid, para 329. 
69 The AG Wathelet’s opinion in Case C-295/12 Telefonica and Telefonica Espana v Commission is accessible 
at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=142183&pageIndex=0&doclang=IT&mode=r
eq&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=385399 
70 CJ judgment, Case C-295/12 Telefonica and Telefonica Espana v Commission, 10 July 2014. The judgment is 
not yet published, but is accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0295 
71 Ibid, para 291. 
72 Between brackets are the references in the above-mentioned judgment to Deutsche Telekom v Commission. 
to find infringement of Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] […]. Thus, the competition rules 
laid down in the EC Treaty supplement, by ex post review, the regulatory framework 
adopted by the EU legislature for ex ante regulation of the telecommunications markets 
[…]”73. 
The judgment also rejected Telefónica’s claims that the Commission would have 
infringed the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and legal certainty “since [the 
Commission] interferes without good reason in the exercise of the power of the [Spanish 
telecommunications regulator]”74. 
However, in particular with respect to the principle of subsidiarity, the GC stated that 
Article 5 EC provides that the Commission can intervene and take action “only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member states 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
by the Community [the Commission]”75.  
Here the GC confirmed once again, in line with the Deutsche Telekom judgments, the 
Commission’s competence in applying and enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU going 
beyond the range of actions of NRAs. The judgment stated that the Spanish regulator “is not a 
competition authority and it has never intervened to enforce Article 82 EC or adopted decisions 
relating to the practices penalised in the contested decision […].  The Commission cannot be 
bound by a decision taken by a national authority pursuant to Article 82 EC”76. 
The GC also recalled the judgment in the Deutsche Telekom v Commission77 case where 
the CJ stated “[…] notwithstanding such legislation, if a dominant vertically integrated 
undertaking has scope to adjust even only its retail prices, the margin squeeze may on that 
ground alone be attributable to it”78. 
At CJ level, Adv Gen Wathelet confirmed in his opinion79 the principle of unlimited 
jurisdiction of the European Court, and its possibility to cancel or to confirm a fine, but also to 
reduce or to increase it80. He also confirmed that the EC did not breach the duty of cooperation 
                                                          
73 GC judgment, Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v. Commission, para 293 (emphasis added). 
74 Ibid, see paragraphs 296 ff. 
75 Ibid, 297.  
76 Ibid, 301 (emphasis added). 
77 CJ judgment, Case C‑280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission, para 85. 
78 GC judgment, Case T-336/07, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v. Commission, para 330. 
79 The AG’s Opinion in Case C-295/12 Telefonica and Telefonica Espana v Commission, accessible at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=142183&pageIndex=0&doclang=IT&mode=r
eq&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=385399 
80 AG Wathelet also stated that the paragraphs of the GC’s judgment in Telefónica with respect to the calculation 
of the fines do not contain a genuine analysis and recommended the GC to conduct ex novo a full review of the 
Commission decision with respect to the amount of the fine.  
with the Spanish regulator. He thus reaffirmed the principle that, in line with Regulation 
1/2003, the Commission does not have a duty of consultation with NRAs81. He spoke for the 
rejection of Telefónica’s appeal claim whereby, according to the incumbent, the EC had 
breached both the duty of loyal cooperation and good administration. He also argued for the 
rejection of the claim that the GC failed to take into consideration Telefónica’s claim that it 
had, in good faith, relied on the conformity of its pricing practices with the scope of Article 
102 TFEU82.  
By contrast, with respect to the imposition and effectiveness of fines, Adv Gen Wathelet 
submitted that the GC had not exercised its power of review over the EC decision correctly 
with respect to the fine. As such, he argued for the annulment of the GC judgment83.  
However, on 10 July 2014 the CJ upheld the GC’s judgment84. The CJ rejected the claim 
that the GC “[had] disregarded the principle of legal certainty by accepting that conduct which 
complied with the regulatory framework may constitute a breach of Article 102 TFEU”85. The 
CJ considered the complaint as “unfounded since, as the Commission, the ECTA and France 
Telecom correctly observe, the fact that an undertaking’s conduct complies with a regulatory 
framework does not mean that such conduct complies with Article 102 TFEU”86. 
Paragraphs 134 and 135 of the CJ judgment are key in reaffirming the centrality, 
independence and autonomy of the Commission in ascertaining potential infringements of 
Article 102 TFEU. Telefónica argued that 
“the General Court clearly distorted their claims and disregarded the fact that the 
objectives pursued by competition law and by the regulatory framework are the same. 
Since those objectives are the same, the General Court should have ascertained whether 
the Commission’s intervention on the ground of infringement of competition law is 
compatible with the objectives pursued by the Comisión del Mercado de las 
Telecomunicaciones (Spanish Commission for the Telecommunications Markets, CMT) 
under the regulatory framework”87.  
                                                          
81 AG Wathelet, Opinion, para 41. 
82 Ibid, para 55. 
83 Ibid, para 175. 
84 CJ judgment, Case C-295/12 Telefonica and Telefonica Espana v Commission, 10 July 2014. The judgment is 
not yet published, but is accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0295. 
85 Ibid, para 132. 
86 Clear on this point is para 128 of the CJ's judgment of 10 July 2014: “It should be recalled in that regard that 
Article 102 TFEU is of general application and cannot be restricted, inter alia, as the General Court was correct 
to point out at paragraph 293 of the judgment under appeal, by the existence of a regulatory framework adopted 
by the EU legislature for ex ante regulation of the telecommunications markets”. 
87 CJ judgment, Case C-295/12, Telefonica and Telefonica Espana v Commission, para 134. 
However the CJ rejects this argument stating that  
“it is, in part, inadmissible, in so far as it alleges distortion of the appellants’ arguments, 
since the appellants fail to identify the arguments which they claim the General Court 
distorted and, in part, unfounded, in so far as it alleges breach of the principle of 
subsidiarity, since the Commission’s implementation of Article 102 TFEU is not subject 
to any prior consideration of action taken by national authorities”88. 
 This point confirms the approach of European Courts vis à vis the role of the 
Commission with respect to the conduct of dominant undertakings as far as they allege that 
they have followed the guidelines of NRAs, without being left with a margin of doubt. 
The judgments in the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica cases are therefore particularly 
important for the definition and the “reconstruction” of the conduct that may lead to abuse by 
way of a margin squeeze. They are also quintessential for having clarified the applicability of 
Article 102 TFEU to conducts that might have been put in place within the boundaries and the 
limits of regulatory provisions that, per se, are not sufficient to exclude an infringement by the 
incumbent. The position of the Commission and the European Courts (as well as of the AGs) 
is unanimous in stressing that in analysing the behaviour of companies, the EC is exclusively 
bound by the Treaty and its provisions (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). Considered irrelevant are 
therefore ex ante remedies (including the imposition of prices aimed at favouring rather than 
hindering competition) imposed on those companies at a regulatory level.  
Before focusing on the rationale of the CIF case, showing the consistency of the last 
decade’s worth of EU jurisprudence, another case of margin squeeze has to be mentioned. 
TeliaSonera is a case referred in 2009 to the CJ by the Stockholm District Court. The CJ 
expressed serious concerns about the consequences of margin squeeze for end-consumers 
(preliminary ruling judgment given on 14 February 2011)89. 
The case is relevant because the Commission, somehow departing from its own 
Guidance Paper, stressed that margin squeeze has to be considered harmful for consumers 
without passing through the “refusal to supply test”, irrespective of whether the abusive 
practice is carried out in the presence of a pre-existing duty to deal. As stressed earlier, the 
Guidance Paper considered conduct in the form of margin squeeze under the heading “refusal 
                                                          
88 Ibid, para 135 (emphasis added). 
89 CJ judgment, Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige  (Telia Sonera) of 17 February 2011, 
[2011] ECR I-000, [2011] 4 CMLR 982; see also the Opinion of AG Mazák in this Case.  
to supply”90 as an indirect form of abuse carried out by a dominant undertaking, which in the 
particular market has a duty to supply access to an essential facility. 
The CJ confirmed its concern for final consumers, irrespective of the existence of all 
the pre-conditions that were considered fundamental in the Commission’s Guidance Paper, in 
line with existing and well-settled jurisprudence. The CJ stresses in TeliaSonera how  
“the fact that a vertically integrated undertaking, holding a dominant position on the 
wholesale market in asymmetric digital subscriber line input services, applies a pricing 
practice of such a kind that the spread between the prices applied on that market and 
those applied in the retail market for broadband connection services to end users is not 
sufficient to cover the specific costs which that undertaking must incur in order to gain 
access to that retail market may constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 
TFEU”91. 
More importantly, the CJ underlined that any circumstances may be useful to determine 
whether margin squeeze is abusive, but certainly “it is necessary to demonstrate that, taking 
particular account of whether the wholesale product is indispensable, that practice produces an 
anti-competitive effect, at least potentially, on the retail market, and that the practice is not in 
any way economically justified”92. 
The analysis of these two further cases shows that the doctrine expressed by the CIF 
case in 2003 is still applicable. The rationale behind that judgment, given at the dawn of the 
so called “great enlargement” of the European Union, was that of acknowledging the power 
(or, rather, the duty) of national competition authorities (NCAs) to “neutralise” any existing 
pieces of national legislation in breach of a competition law provision (in that specific case, in 
breach of Article 101 TFEU)93.  
Not all authors are in favour of such an approach. G. Monti noted how there could be a 
valid reason to argue that “until national regulators can be trusted to act independently of the 
                                                          
90 See on this point R. Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law – the Objective and 
Principles of Article 102, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp 273-274. Nazzini notes that AG Mazák suggested a 
different approach, with respect to refusal to supply, in particular (i) to look at the margin squeeze as a form of 
vertical foreclosure tactic similar to that carried out by refusal to supply, (ii) to take into consideration the risk 
that if there is not a duty to deal, “to impose a duty to charge upstream and downstream prices that allow as 
efficient downstream firms to compete effectively would reduce the dominant undertaking’s investment 
incentives” and, most interestingly (iii) to take into consideration an  “a fortiori”, a very subtle, argument: if the 
duty to deal is not a pre-condition, and the company in theory could refuse to supply, “why can it not harm them 
by charging upstream and downstream prices that make it difficult for them to compete?” (R. Nazzini, cited, p 
274). 
91 Case C-52/09 Telia Sonera [2011] ECR I-000, [2011] 4 CMLR 982, para 115 (conclusion) (emphasis added). 
92 Ibid, para 115. 
93 Case C-198/01 CIF, [2003] ECR I-8055, [2003] 5 CMLR 829. 
government and of the incumbent operator, the Commission’s ability to use competition law 
to oversee the markets is necessary to ensure that markets are liberalised and incumbents are 
not protected by regulators”94. However, he also argued that the power of the EC and the 
application of competition law, in particular when NRAs act according to normative schemes 
set up by EU law in regulated sectors, should encounter a reasonable limit in line with a wider 
interpretation of the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, legal certainty and loyal 
cooperation (all principles recalled by Telefónica’s lawyers in the CFI appeal). Indeed, for G. 
Monti, there might be circumstances in which the Commission should be more “deferential” 
to the regulators, in particular when reasons of public interest may suggest that actions 
undertaken or proposed by the regulators may turn to be more apt to address long-term 
concerns, as for instance, the imperative of ensuring stable growth and innovation95. 
The Italian NCA had adopted a more cautious approach, arguing that in principle the 
investigated company could have acted against the general principles of competition law since 
national legislation “authorised” it. By contrast, the CJ was adamant in saying that the duty of 
the NCA to neutralise national legislation contradicting EU law provisions, was in line with 
the general principle of the primacy of European Law96. The European judiciary here drew a 
line between breaches of competition law before the date of the adoption of the NCA’s 
decision, and breaches committed after that date. The need to preserve legal certainty for the 
Court led to a conservative interpretative approach of the conducts put in place before the 
NCA’s decision, therefore excluding the imposition of administrative or criminal sanctions for 
conducts imposed by national legislation.  
To quote P. Nebbia, “the law continues to constitute, for the period prior to the decision 
to disapply it, a shield for the undertaking concerned against all the consequences of an 
infringement of Article 81 and /or 82 [now Art. 101 and 102 TFEU] vis-à-vis both public 
authorities and other economic operators”97. Of course once the NCA had adopted a decision 
(with definitive effects) imposing the disapplication of national, anticompetitive provisions, 
from that moment on “the ‘shield’ no longer protects them for future infringements: their future 
conduct is therefore liable to be penalized”98.  
                                                          
94 G. Monti, ‘Managing the Intersection of Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law’, (2008) Vol. 4 no. 2 
Competition Law Review, 125f. 
95 Ibid, 131. 
96 See one of the first articles published on the CFI judgment by P. Nebbia, Case C 198-01, Consorzio Industrie 
Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorita’ Garante delle Concorrenza e del Mercato, judgment of the Full Court of 9 
September 2003, (2004) 41 C.M.L.R., 843ff. 
97 Ibid, 844. 
98 Ibid. 
The approach of the Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica margin squeeze cases is slightly 
different, but reaches a similar conclusion. 
The most important inference emerging from the analysis of these two cases is that 
when national legislation (and provisions of NRAs) sets prices as guidelines to be followed by 
undertakings in a dominant position, the competition authority (and, a fortiori, the 
Commission) will look at the nature of those provisions more than at the position adopted by 
the NCA with respect to those provisions. The NCA and the Commission will look whether 
the provision imposes or merely facilitates anticompetitive conducts that the dominant 
undertaking can modify in order to avoid exclusionary anti-competitive conducts. 
It is worth recalling here also the conclusions reached by the CIF judgment. If a (past) 
national provision imposed a specific conduct (in this case, prices-cap), the competition 
authority “may not impose penalties in respect of past conduct on the undertakings concerned 
[…]”99. By contrast, and more importantly, the CFI case made it clear also that conducts merely 
facilitated by national provisions but conflicting with competition law, would have been subject 
to scrutiny by the NCAs as well as fined (the NCA “may impose penalties on the undertakings 
concerned in respect of past conduct where the conduct was merely facilitated or promoted by 
the national legislation, whilst taking due account of the specific features of the legislative 
framework in which the undertakings acted”100). 
 
IV. Reference to the energy sector. Similarity of approach 
 
 Dr Koch (deputy head of unit at the DG competition, in charge of the energy sector) 
reaffirmed in a presentation given in Athens in June 2013 the primacy of competition law over 
the activities of regulators. Though he did not expressly refer here to the possibility that NRAs 
establish price-guides that may “mislead” energy incumbents (as argued by DT and Telefonica 
in their defences), he nevertheless stressed the importance of creating a competitive energy 
market in Europe through the cooperation of regulators and competition authorities. He pointed 
out how, where regulators do not adopt measures that prevent or deter abuse such as refusal to 
supply, excessive prices or margin squeeze, competition authorities have to take action through 
                                                          
99 Ibid, conclusion, point 1.  
100 Ibid. For a reconstruction of the perception of the primacy of the European provisions over national law and 
the role played by the NCA in the year following the mass enlargement of 2004, see A. Kaczorowska, ‘The power 
of a national competition authority to disapply national law incompatible with EC law-and its practical 
consequences’, (2004) 9 European Competition Law Review, 591 ff. 
their enforcement activity101. In other words, he very clearly confirmed the supremacy of 
European competition law over regulatory activity, also in terms of remedies (behavioural as 
well as structural) that can be adopted to create a “level playing field” for competition. 
Reference to the recent E.ON102, RWE103 and ENI104 commitments decisions is self-
explanatory here where the EC accepted commitments meant to adopt structural measures 
going beyond the scope of European and national legislation authorising mere behavioural 
remedies to enhance competitiveness. He stressed how it may happen that regulators (for 
instance, in the energy sector, but similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to 
communications) may have insufficient competencies or independence. By contrast, 
competition law could be more efficient, applied faster and with stronger investigative powers.  
 The most important consequence from this reasoning, in favour of the supremacy of 
competition enforcement over the activities of NRAs, is that the Commission can also use the 
tools established by Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. Hence, not only fines or behavioural 
remedies, but also structural remedies would be applicable under EU law.  
This approach shows the centrality and the guidance role played by the Commission, not only 
in detecting abusive conducts and imposing fines even where provisions adopted by national 
regulators may theoretically justify the conducts put in place by the incumbent, but also in 
choosing remedies, such as structural divestitures, going beyond the provisions contained in 
the existing regulatory framework.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The analysed judgments have confirmed the unity of the European legal system over 
the last decade, through the joint actions of the European Commission, NCAs and European 
Courts. This is true, in particular, in regulated markets such as electronic communications, 
though the same conclusion can be reached with respect to energy markets. With respect to the 
                                                          
101 Dr Oliver Koch (deputy head of unit at DG Energy, European Commission), ‘Creating competitive energy 
markets through joint enforcement of energy regulators and competition authorities’, conference held in Athens 
on the 5 June 2013. 
102 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ C36/8 of 13 
February 2009, accessible at http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
103 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, summary decision in 
[2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf 
104 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010, [2010] OJ C352/8 of 23 December 
2010, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39315/39315_3019_9.pdf. 
 
latter, the EC has adopted pro-competitive remedies in a number of commitments decisions 
already (E.ON, RWE and ENI) that go beyond existing regulatory provisions. It has shown that 
when the enforcement authority is called to recreate a pro-competitive environment, it has a 
wider “room of manoeuvre” at remedial level than the same regulatory provisions, both at 
European and national level.  
The paper’s conclusion is meant to show how Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica are in 
line with the Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi judgment. Both confirm the existence of a limit 
for the enforcement activities of the EC in applying Article 101 and 102 TFEU when national 
legislation requires specific anticompetitive behaviours (see on this respect the position of the 
GC in Telefonica where it expressly states “[…] Article 82 EC applies only to anti-competitive 
conduct engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative. If anti-competitive conduct is 
required of undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which 
itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Article 82 EC does not 
apply. In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not attributable, as that provision 
implicitly requires, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings […]”105, but also de facto 
confirming the non-applicability of the “regulatory authority dixit” defence where the 
dominant undertaking had the possibility of adopting upstream or downstream (retail) prices 
that would not have driven competitors from the  market.  
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